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Abstract 
Regional economic development has been long conceptualised as a non-linear, interactive and 
socially embedded process: these features were traditionally regarded as spatially mediated 
and highly localised. However, unprecedentedly fast technological change coupled with the 
intensification of global economic integration processes has spurred the need to place regional 
development in a truly open and interdependent framework. Despite substantial progress 
made by the academic literature, rethinking regional development in this perspective still 
presents a number of challenges in terms of concepts, empirical evidence and policy 
approaches. Following an interdisciplinary assessment of how openness and connectivity – 
proxied by one particular of the many cross-border flows, i.e. global investments – interact with 
regional economic development trajectories, this paper presents a picture of the geography of 
foreign investments from and to the European regions and its change after the financial and 
economic crisis in 2008. This simple exercise allows us to shed some initial light on how the 
operationalisation of regional connectivity can improve our empirical understanding of the 
evolution of regional economies and the policy approach needed to support their reaction to 
change. 
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Global Investments and Regional 
Development Trajectories: the Missing Links  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent literature on regional economic development has reached a 
consensus on the idea that spatial proximity, density and localised processes 
should be placed into the wider context of economic globalisation by 
accounting for other forms of proximity between local and non-local agents 
(e.g. Uyarra, 2011; Huber, 2012; Crescenzi et al., 2016b). Regional economic and 
innovation trajectories do not depend exclusively on localised productive and 
knowledge assets, but need to combine ‘local buzz’ (Storper and Venables, 
2004) and ‘global pipelines’ (Bathelt et al., 2004). The latter are non-spatially 
bounded linkages and networks that channel and diffuse new and valuable 
knowledge across space. For the development of these links geographical 
proximity constitutes “neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition” 
(Boschma, 2005, 62), while other non-spatial relations – i.e. cognitive, 
organisational, social and institutional – play a crucial role as complements 
and/or substitutes of physical closeness (e.g. D’Este et al., 2013; Crescenzi et al., 
2016b). 
A significant role in the establishment and governance of such pipelines is 
attributed to multinational enterprises (MNEs) as major ‘flagships’, or 
connectors, in global production networks (GPNs) (e.g. Dicken, 1994, 2003, 
2007; Ernst and Kim, 2002; Henderson et al., 2002; Dicken and Henderson, 2003; 
Coe et al., 2004, 2008; Hobday et al., 2005; Wrigley et al., 2005; Hess and Yeung, 
2006; Yeung, 2009). The GPN approach combines the insights of various similar 
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perspectives that capture the spread of value added creation and distribution 
across firm boundaries and geographical borders, such as those of global 
commodity chains (GCCs) and global value chains (GVCs) (see, among others, 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gereffi and Kaplinsky, 2001; Gereffi, 2005; 
Gereffi et al., 2005).1   
Despite considerable academic advances in reconciling firms’ cross-borders 
organisational networks with space-specific assets and institutional structures 
– i.e. the ‘strategic coupling’ process which ultimately drives contemporary 
regional economic development (e.g. Coe et al., 2004, 2008; Yeung, 2009, 2016) 
– still substantial gaps are left in the literature, particularly when looking for 
global-local frameworks for the ‘diagnosis’ of local economic conditions and 
the design of public policies. This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap by 
conceptually and critically discussing the heterogeneity of regional openness 
and connectivity – here intended in terms of global investment flows – through 
the lenses of an ‘integrated framework’ for the analysis of local economic 
development (Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011) that systematically links 
localised regional assets and socio-institutional features with global 
connectivity. As an empirical example of how global investment flows are 
connected to regional trajectories and their change, the paper describes the 
relative position of the subnational regions of the European Union in the 
inflows and outflows of greenfield Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to and from 
the area. By using information from the fDi Markets-Financial Times database for 
the period 2003-2014, we follow up on previous work and classify regions in a 
dynamic perspective, looking in particular at different stages of the value chain, 
or functions (e.g. Sturgeon 2008; Crescenzi et al., 2014), before and after the 2008 
                                                 1 Although there is substantial similarity among the concepts (GPNs, GVCs, GCCs), there are also important differences. The distinction is however not bounding for our purposes here, as our argument does not relate to any particular structures and governance of such networks; for an insightful discussion see Coe et al. (2008). 
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financial crisis. The heterogeneity of (short-term) regional development 
trajectories and global connectivity patterns can offer some initial insights 
towards a more critical and nuanced interpretation of how regions react to 
shocks, and sheds some initial light on the importance of a more careful 
coordination of bottom-up and top-down place-based development policies. 
The paper is organised in four sections. The following Section 2 provides a 
snapshot of the academic debate on the interdependence of corporate and 
geographical connections and linkages, and highlights similarities in 
governance issues that both firms and regions are confronting. It focuses on 
three dimensions of connectivity – spatial extent, nature and directionality – and 
relates the concept with regional economic development. Section 3 presents 
some descriptive evidence of the geography of foreign investment flows in and 
from the European Union over the years 2003-2014, attempts a dynamic 
classification of EU regions in terms of connectivity measured by these flows 
before and after the recent financial and economic crisis, and tentatively links 
these regional typologies to regional development trajectories. Section 4 
concludes, highlighting some possible implications for public policies and the 
challenges ahead in the analysis of global-local interdependence. 
 
 
2. Global firms’ networks and regional connectivity  
2.1 Connectivity and global investment flows: spatial extent, nature 
and directionality 
Three key features of the current phase of economic globalisation have direct 
geographical implications (Iammarino and McCann, 2013). First, the share of 
developing and emerging economies on global FDI flows has grown steadily 
and, for the first time in history, accounted for more than a half of world total 
inflows in 2012 (55% in 2014), and more than one third of total outflows in 2014, 
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confirming a massive transformation in the geography of foreign investment 
worldwide (UNCTAD, 2015), and in the European regions in particular 
(Crescenzi et al., 2016c). Second, the majority of these cross-border flows span 
neighbouring economies, rather than being genuinely global transactions. This 
global regionalism is also characterised by the slicing up and recombination of 
global value chains in which establishments and groups of activities are 
‘unbundled’ (Baldwin, 2011) primarily across groups of neighbouring 
economic systems (e.g. Rugman, 2005; Guy, 2009, 2015). Third, around two-
thirds of global FDI stocks are now in service industries (63% in 2012), with the 
remaining one third involving manufacturing. Services liberalisation, their 
increasing tradability due to ICT technologies, and the steady rise of 
GPNs/GVCs spurring the internationalization of services related to 
manufacturing, have all implied a substantial redistribution of comparative 
advantages across countries and regions, mirroring that of global GDP 
(UNCTAD, 2015). 
Vertical disintegration, international outsourcing and offshoring have emerged 
as predominant modes of control and coordination of MNE activities, giving 
rise to what has been labelled the ‘concentrated dispersion’ of geographical 
production and knowledge networks (Ernst 1997, 1998; Ernst et al., 2001; Ernst 
and Kim 2002). GPNs integrate the dispersed supply and customer bases of 
MNEs, that is their subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, suppliers and 
subcontractors, distribution channels and value-added resellers, as well as their 
R&D collaborations and different kinds of cooperative agreements. MNEs 
break down the value chain into a variety of discrete functions, operations and 
transactions, and locate them where they can be carried out most effectively, 
improving firms’ access to new intangible assets, and facilitating entry into new 
markets. The main purpose is to tap into location-specific resources and 
capabilities that are complementary to the firm’s own, at the same time 
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broadening its capacity of knowledge transfer to individual nodes of the GPN 
(Ernst et al., 2001; Ernst and Kim 2002; Coe et al. 2004). Such linkages open up 
new development and upgrading opportunities for the regions and firms 
involved. Indeed, GPNs in particular industries – such as electronics – have 
actually shifted to global innovation networks (GINs), with the integration of 
functions such as engineering, product development, design and research 
within inter-firm networks situated for the most part in emerging locations in 
new-comer economies (Ernst, 2010).  
Corporate networks have dramatically altered regional connectivity and 
interdependence around the world. MNE networks have spurred spikier 
geographies and uneven regional development, depending on the variation 
across urban and regional innovative and institutional capabilities to cash in on 
the presence of global ‘gatekeepers’ to build new absolute and comparative 
advantages. When competitive advantages are seen through the lenses of a 
fine-grained economic geography and perceived as simultaneously firm-
specific and place-specific (Young et al., 1994; Ietto-Gillies, 2012; Iammarino 
and McCann, 2016), the balance between endogenous and exogenous (to the 
region) knowledge sources and the overall degree of connectivity become far 
more relevant issues. It is not the simple regional connectedness – i.e. the 
architecture of transport and communication infrastructure – but rather the 
broader connectivity that matters: the capability of individuals, firms, 
organizations and institutions to interact and engage across geographical space 
and within networks (Iammarino and McCann, 2016). Regional connectivity is 
the degree of two-way (inward and outward) openness that shapes the regional 
churn of skills, talent, competences and business functions/value chain stages 
(Crescenzi et al., 2014). Even when inflows and outflows are balanced, 
suggesting that an ‘equilibrium’ has been reached by the regional economy, the 
dynamic recombination of key cognitive and productive local assets leads to 
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the enduring capability of cities and regions to adapt, react and develop in an 
ever-changing global environment.  
The literature on the impacts of foreign investment flows – just one, albeit very 
important, of the many cross-border flows associated with the new 
international division of labour – has emphasised the importance of the 
spillovers from global firms to their host locations (e.g. Blomström and Persson 
1983; Kokko 1996; Blomström and Kokko 1998; Javorcik 2004; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 2008). Conversely, the influence of region-specific advantages on 
the growth and evolution of the ‘hosted’ MNEs as well as of the ‘sending’ 
regions has remained under-explored.  An emerging body of literature 
indicates that, while domestic outsourcing of value-added services such as 
R&D and design is relatively less diffused than that of production, the 
externalisation of such innovation-intensive functions is more likely to span 
internationally, suggesting that firms’ concerns about local competition are 
compensated by new streams of knowledge sourced in more distant regional 
systems (e.g. Cusmano et al., 2010; Malecki, 2010). The impressive surge of both 
inward and outward FDI to and from developing and emerging locations – 
until recently characterised by very low or even null connectivity (UNCTAD, 
2015) – supports the idea that economic development requires increasing and 
simultaneous two-way connectivity. 
Following this line of argument, regional economic development is shaped by 
the co-existence and co-evolution – in the same functionally integrated spatial 
unit – of flows diversified in terms of their spatial extent, nature and directionality. 
First, not only spatially bounded (intra- and inter-firm) regional flows matter 
to regional development trajectories: alternative non-spatial proximities make 
the geographical extent of these flows extra-local, international and global 
(spatial extent). Second, the nature of the flows is highly diverse: capital, skills 
and knowledge are bundled in the intra- and inter-firm connections that form 
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GPNs/GVCs. The actual combination of their constituent elements and their 
sophistication/complexity depend on the function (or value chain stage) 
pursued by the agents ‘connected’ by each flow (for example, the networks 
generated in order to pursue R&D activities in different locations might be 
more intensive in skills and knowledge than those driven by capital-intensive 
production activities). Third, local economies can be simultaneously origin 
and/or destination of the flows of investment by MNEs. If openness has been 
extensively associated to economic development and growth (e.g. Baldwin, 
2006; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008), it is the simultaneous exposure to inflows 
and outflows (bi-directionality) in places – like most of the European Union – 
where the concepts of ‘host’ and ‘home’ overlap and blur that identifies the 
capability of cities and regions to constantly renew their competitive advantage 
and to react to shocks, shaping their long-term socio-economic performance, 
welfare and resilience. 
2.2 Connectivity and regional economic development  
Following the above line of argument, regional economic development 
trajectories can be re-conceptualised and analysed in terms of the degree of 
local connectivity through global investment flows (among a variety of other 
channels) of varying spatial extent, nature and directionality. Connectivity 
does not operate (and is not formed) in a territorial vacuum; it is part of a set of 
geographical, economic and socio-institutional features that interactively shape 
both innovation and regional development. Networks (and the corresponding 
flows) based on alternative, non-spatial proximities interact with four other 
‘keystones’ of regional development in an integrated framework (Crescenzi 
and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011 and 2012): (i) the link between local innovative 
efforts and knowledge generation; (ii) the geographical diffusion of knowledge 
spillovers and the region’s industrial specialization; (iii) the genesis and 
structure of local and regional policies; and (iv) the existence and efficiency of 
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regional innovation systems and supportive socio-institutional environments. 
The interaction of these five pillars determines the evolutionary trajectories of 
countries and regions by: (i) shaping the capability of local actors to establish 
relations based on both spatial and non-spatial forms of proximity and defining 
the connectivity of each region and its position in global networks; (ii) 
influencing how global knowledge and resources made available by regional 
connectivity are de-coded and put into productive use in the regional economy, 
as well as how local resources and the results of local innovative efforts are 
‘channelled’ into global markets (Crescenzi, 2014). 
How does connectivity – here intended as linkages provided by global 
investment flows – change consolidated views of local economic development?  
The existing literature has mainly compared MNE subsidiaries with domestic 
firms in order to identify the potential advantages of the former: MNEs tend to 
be more productive, invest more in R&D and generate more knowledge than 
other firms (e.g. Castellani and Zanfei, 2007; Dicken, 2007; Criscuolo et al. 2010). 
On the other hand, the attention has been focused on the identification of the 
channels of spillovers from MNEs to domestic firms with a net separation 
between inter-industry and intra-industry effects. Intra-industry channels 
include demonstration, competition and labour market effects. Demonstration 
effects rely on the benefits coming from the exposure to the superior technology 
of MNEs subsidiaries (e.g. Girma et al., 2001); competition effects build on the 
idea that the competitive pressure caused by the entry of foreign firms may act 
as an incentive for domestic firms to use available resources and existing 
technology more efficiently (e.g. Blomstrom and Lipsey, 1989); finally, labour 
market effects are mainly mediated by labour mobility (e.g. Driffield and 
Taylor, 2000). Inter-industry knowledge diffusion is based on backward and 
forward linkages and/or technological complementarity: firms operating in 
different industrial segments that are vertically connected and/or shares 
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technological bases with each other are in fact more likely to benefit from 
positive externalities (Ernst and Kim, 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Boschma, 2005).  
The analysis of these mechanisms has not led to a consensus in the literature 
on the overall balance between these forces. Various studies have highlighted 
significant barriers to the absorption of new technologies by domestic firm (e.g. 
Castellani and Zanfei, 2002), ‘market stealing effects’ at the expenses of 
domestic firms (e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999), and limited labour mobility 
due to higher wages paid by foreign enterprises. As also highlighted by Coe et 
al. (2004, 481) “the developmental impact of the coupling process is highly 
variable and contingent, and by no means automatically beneficial for the 
region.”2  
On the other hand, outward investment may have both direct and indirect 
effects on domestic firms and the home economy (see, for a review, Barba 
Navaretti and Venables, 2006). The direct benefits of firms’ engagement in 
production activities abroad are those intrinsic in multinationality, i.e. higher 
efficiency, productivity and innovativeness of domestic MNEs. Similarly, 
indirect effects are related to both forward/backward linkages and knowledge 
spillovers of domestic MNEs on the rest of the home economy. However, the 
overall impact on the home country (region) remains ambiguous: it depends 
on the net balance between delocalised activities and reconfiguration of home 
production (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; Castellani and Pieri, 2015). The 
theoretical literature has emphasised the crucial relevance of the nature of FDI: 
domestic firms may gain from the relocation of production towards relatively 
less advanced economies by triggering specialization by function within each 
industry, rather than by sector (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007; Robert-
                                                 2 See	also	Narula	and	Dunning	(2010,	283):	“Quite apart from the dangers of crowding-out and the problems of stage-inappropriate MNE activities, it is not clear that increased MNE activity in terms 
of	stock	or	flows	necessarily	implies	a	proportional	increase	in	spillovers	and	linkages”. 
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Nicoud, 2008). Consistently, existing evidence shows that more intense 
outward FDI are associated, at least in the short run, with lower productivity 
and employment destruction – especially unskilled – at home. However, 
compensation effects of higher value added productions and job creation in the 
home economy are also likely to emerge, particularly in the case of FDI towards 
regions and countries with a relatively lower level of development (e.g. 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Driffield et al., 2009; Barba Navaretti et 
al., 2010; Castellani and Pieri, 2015; Gagliardi et al., 2015). Positive effects may 
be strengthened over time thanks to efficiency gains linked to the geographical 
rationalization of production along the value chain, and to the dynamic 
benefits stemming from tapping into new sources of innovation and technical 
knowledge elsewhere (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2003; Castellani and Pieri, 
2013).  
However, as pointed out by Castellani and Pieri (2015), the impact on the home 
economy of internationalisation through investment abroad by domestic firms 
has until recently been rarely considered as a factor affecting regional 
development and growth, due to the lack of both strong conceptual 
frameworks and accurate information on the spatial scale and extent of outward 
FDI (see also Mudambi, 2007). Adjustment costs associated with the transition 
towards models of internationalisation based on bi-directional global 
investment flows may be particularly relevant for less resilient peripheral 
regions, raising important questions about the spatial distribution of the 
benefits from the globalisation of production in advanced economies (e.g. Elia 
et al., 2009; Kemeny and Rigby, 2012).  
The bulk of innovation studies posit that corporate dynamic capabilities, and 
therefore firm growth, are associated with both the openness of firms to their 
external knowledge environments, and with their internal knowledge-
generating capacity (e.g. Fontana et al., 2006). The increasing empirical 
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evidence on firm heterogeneity has also been acknowledged by the new 
economic geography (Ottaviano, 2011), casting doubt on the overarching 
power of the ‘comparative advantage’ concept, strictly reliant on a broad and 
static sectoral view of gains and losses in the competitive contest (Camagni, 
2002; Kitson et al., 2004; Bailey and Driffield, 2007). Firm heterogeneous 
performance, even in the same industry and national economy, shows that 
advantages can be absolute, i.e. based on innovation and social capabilities, 
institutional capacity, and rooted in open and well-connected locations.  
Thus, an interesting parallel can be drawn between the micro-level of the firm 
and the meso-level of the region with respect to dynamic capabilities. The main 
advantage of today’s MNEs is to master system integration – i.e. complex 
coordination of activities combining different products, services, technologies 
and knowledge across spatial and functional boundaries (Malecki, 2010). 
Similarly, ‘systemic integration’ at the regional level involves coordinating and 
balancing a diverse structure of ‘value networks’ – which refers to trade flows, 
human capital and skills mobility, innovation linkages, foreign and domestic 
multinational presence, etc. – some of which rely on geographical proximity, 
whilst others are based on other forms of vicinity.  
Openness and interrelatedness, as manifested in the global corporate 
organisation network, have been largely considered at the national system 
level, often proxied by involvement in international trade, but still fail to be 
recognised as an essential engine of development in the case of regions 
(Gambardella et al., 2009). Complementarity and relatedness between old and 
new knowledge, and between local and extra-local capabilities and networks, 
are all necessary conditions for ensuring ‘diversity for growth’ (Jacobs 1961, 
194) in economic systems at different levels of geography (e.g. Fagerberg and 
Srholec, 2008; Boschma and Iammarino, 2009). The local institutional capacity 
to blend internal and external sources of knowledge and assets – thus, to master 
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‘systemic integration’, building absolute advantages and resilience – underlie 
interregional inequality and the formation of new spatial hierarchies, 
particularly visible in a context such as that of the European Union, leading to 
‘more similar but less equal’ (Paci 1997) patterns of regional development.  
The relative importance of the embeddedness of foreign firms into the local 
fabric (e.g. Turok, 1999) – traditionally seen as crucial for their positive impact 
on the regional economy – becomes a second-order concern relative to the 
effective co-ordination of different ‘value networks’ by local firms, 
organisations and institutions. In fact, vertical disintegration through 
outsourcing and offshoring may indeed threaten the thickness of localised 
networks and relational density, strengthening the asymmetric effects of 
openness across space (e.g. Cusmano et al., 2010). 
A more complete, critical and nuanced consideration of global connectivity 
would enhance our understanding of local economic development trajectories, 
including the response of regions to shocks, which has prompted lively debates 
in scholarly and policy circles in the aftermath of the financial and economic 
crisis of the end of the 2000s. Evolutionary economic geography has interpreted 
resilience in terms of the historical capacity of regions to reconfigure their 
socio-economic and institutional structures, enabling new development paths 
(see, for all, Martin and Sunley, 2014, and Boschma, 2015). Although a few 
attempts have been made in order to incorporate the role of knowledge 
(Boschma, 2005) and trade networks into the concept (Thissen et al. 2013), there 
is currently neither conceptual integration nor systematic evidence on the link 
between regional connectivity via global investment flows and regional 
resilience. The assessment of the balance between inward and outward flows, 
in terms of creation/destruction of economic activities, sectors and functions, 
employment, skills and innovation is all the more urgent to advance our 
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understanding of regional development trajectories and resilience and the 
ways to enhance them. 
 
 
3. Regions on the move: a broad-brush picture of regional 
connectivity through global investment flows in Europe  
3.1 Direction and change of FDI in and from the European regions 
Regional connectivity is key to local and regional economic trajectories. As 
argued above, the spatial extent, nature and directionality of the flows connecting 
each region to the rest of the global economy are fundamental, although often 
overlooked, diagnostic tools for local economic development analysis. In order 
to provide an initial and evocative hint on this dimension we look into FDI in 
and from the European regions. As already mentioned, FDI by no means can 
capture the complexity of flows and exchanges that form the multi-scalar web 
of global inter-regional connectivity neither can they fully proxy the complexity 
of GPNs/GVCs. However, MNEs do play a leading role in the development 
and control of GPNs/GVCs, with FDI being a significant (and in some sectors 
predominant) mode of governance of such organisational and governance 
structures. And – even more relevant for practical purposes – FDI leaves ‘paper 
trails’ that can be more easily followed and analysed across large samples of 
cities and regions than other components of GPNs/GVCs. Detailed and 
comparable data on other (more flexible) forms of networking between firms 
(e.g. sub-contracting, outsourcing, joint-ventures, trade, knowledge and skills 
exchange) would be ideal for our purposes here but, unfortunately, they are 
not available at the sub-national level for multiple countries.  
Therefore, in order to grasp at least prima facie the connectivity of European 
regions, this paper relies on fDi Markets-Financial Times data, comprising 
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records of individual greenfield foreign investment ‘projects’ in all European 
regions across all sectors and classified by main business function. The dataset 
includes city-level information on the origin of the investment (or ‘sending 
city/region’) and its destination (or ‘receiving city/region’). The analysis covers 
the period between 2003 (starting year of data collection) and 2014 (most recent 
post-crisis year with complete data), and includes all cross-border greenfield 
and brownfield investment3 inward and outward Europe from/to the world 
including intra-Europe. The latter is defined as follows: European Union 28 
(EU)4, EFTA countries5, Candidates countries (CCs)6.  
The figures that follow offer a broad-brush picture of the connectivity of the 
European regions through global investment flows, its directionality and 
evolution over time.  
  
                                                 3 In the database Joint Ventures are tracked only when they lead to new operations, whereas Mergers & Acquisitions as well as other equity investment are	 not	 included.	 Foreign	 firms’	operations are identified by Financial Times analysts through a wide variety of sources, including nearly 9,000 media sources, project data from over 1,000 industry organizations and investment agencies, and data purchased from market research and publication companies. Furthermore, each project is cross-referenced across multiple sources and more than 90 percent of investment projects are validated with company sources. In addition, Crescenzi et al. (2014) and Ascani et al. (2016) show that investment projects recorded in fDi Markets are highly correlated with other macro-level data on FDI from UNCTAD, IMF and the World Bank. 
4 EU28 includes: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Andorra, Greenland, Monaco, and San Marino are also included in EU28. 5 EFTA includes: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. 6  Candidate countries include: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. 
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Figure 1 – Foreign Direct Investment towards the Regions of Europe 
(Cumulative Inward Capital Expenditure 2003-2014, Million USD). 
 
 
Source: authors’	elaboration	on	fDi–Markets data 
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Figure 2 – Foreign Direct Investment originating from the Regions of Europe 
(Cumulative Outward Capital Expenditure 2003-2014, Million USD). 
 
 
 Source: authors’	elaboration	on	fDi–Markets data 
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Figures 1 and 2 map the spatial distribution of inward (Fig. 1) and outward 
(Fig. 2) FDI cumulative capital expenditure (Capex)7 in the EU regions (at the 
Territorial Level 2 of the OECD Regional Classification8,9) over the 2003-2014 
period.  The spatial distribution of the non-normalised value of FDI inflows 
(Fig. 1) highlights a consolidated geography of foreign presence in Europe. The 
well-established core-periphery patterns in the distribution of overall economic 
activity overlap only in part with the location of inward of FDI. ‘Core’ EU-15 
regions are large recipients of FDI together with the most developed regions in 
Central and Eastern European members. However, a number of more 
peripheral regions in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and in the Candidate 
Countries are also relevant hotspots for the attraction of FDI. The geography of 
regional outward FDI (Fig. 2) is concentrated in the ‘Blue Banana’ of Europe 
and in capital cities, confirming the spatial selectivity of active 
internationalisation processes. A simple descriptive analysis of the change in 
the spatial extent, nature and directionality of these flows offers relevant 
                                                 7 The relative variation of FDI cumulative inflows and outflows between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods could also be expressed in terms of number of projects and/or employment. However, capital expenditure (i.e. the capital invested) offers a more accurate picture of the evolution of FDI flows. On the one hand, the distribution of the number of projects is strongly skewed (for Europe both as a source and a destination). On the other hand, the relative variation of estimated employment generated by the new FDI projects could be misleading. For many investment projects, particularly in outflows from Europe – the number of jobs created is an 
estimate	of	the	‘expected’	number	of	employees	that	will	be	hired	in	the	new	subsidiary:	as	a	result,	this information is often missing in the database. 8 This classification has a direct correspondence to the EUROSTAT Regional Classification based on the NUTS regions but has the advantage of better capturing regional units with institutional and functional coherence. OECD TL2 regions correspond to EUROSTAT NUTS1 regions in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and United Kingdom.  Conversely, TL2 regions correspond to NUTS2 regions in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. NUTS3 regions are instead the relevant units in Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Macedonia. No relevant sub-national classification is defined in Albania, Andorra, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greenland, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montenegro, San Marino, and Serbia. 9  For those countries with no subnational classification provided by the Eurostat 2013 NUTS shapefile (e.g. Albania), the data have been allocated at the national level (shapefile downloaded from: http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/geoportal/data/esri/esri_intl.htm). 
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insights on these multi-layered geographies and links with regional 
trajectories. 
In order to capture the (short-term) evolution of the connectivity of the EU 
regions – as a preliminary indication of their capacity to re-configure their 
position in global investment flows in response to shocks – Figures 3 and 4 look 
respectively at the relative variation of FDI cumulative capital expenditure 
inflows and outflows between the pre-crisis (2003-2008) and the post-crisis 
(2009-2014) periods.  
Figure 3 – Changes in Foreign Direct Investment towards the Regions of 
Europe after the crisis (Differences in Capital Expenditure between 2003-
2008 and 2009-2014). 
 
 
Source: authors’	elaboration	on	fDi–Markets data 
Riccardo Crescenzi & Simona Iammarino 
 19 
Figure 4 – Changes in Foreign Direct Investment originating from the 
Regions of Europe after the crisis (Differences in Capital Expenditure 
between 2003-2008 and 2009-2014). 
 
 
Source: authors’	elaboration	on	fDi–Markets data 
Different colours mark different positions of the regions in the distribution of 
the possible reactions to the 2008 crisis in terms of inward and outward FDI 
flows. The classification is based on the distribution of the normalised change 
in the capital invested between the two periods: each colour-coded category 
identifies a quintile of the distribution.10 A sixth category – the green colour 
with orange dots – is included in the maps to identify outliers. The latter are 
                                                 10  The distributions for inward and outward FDI are skewed in different directions and the classification of the regions across quintiles reflects these differences, resulting in a different colour-coding in the two maps catered around zero. Moreover, when a region did not receive/made any investment in 2003-2014 it is coloured white. 
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regions characterized by a relative variation of FDI in the post-crisis period 
larger than 300%: this is mostly associated to regions with pre-crisis investment 
values close to zero that inflate the percentage change even with modest 
increases in the following period. Whilst focussing on the individual maps can 
shed light on the evolution of investment flows over time (changes in 
connectivity across space), the comparison of the two maps offers a first 
description of the directionality of the flows and their relative balance. 
Both maps mark in yellow the regions that can be classified as stayers, i.e. those 
that maintained a similar magnitude of FDI inflows and/or outflows before and 
after the crisis (percentage change close to zero). Figure 3 shows that, in terms 
of inflows, the stayers are localised: a) around the central axis of Europe from 
the North (Yorkshire and the Humber, North East, and North West England), 
to the Centre (the regions of Île-de-France, Southern- and Western Netherlands, 
those in the north-west of Germany, and Lombardia, Liguria, and Emilia-
Romagna in northern Italy), and the South (Apulia and Basilicata in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno); b) in Eastern Europe, with regions in Hungary (Central and 
Western Transdanubia, Northern Hungary), Lithuania (Kaunas, Šiauliai and 
Vilnius Counties), Romania (Sud-Muntenia and Sud-Est) and in the candidate 
countries of the Balkans (Albania and Kosovo) and Turkey (East Marmara, 
Istanbul, West Anatolia). Turning to FDI outflows in Figure 4, the stayers are 
concentrated in the north (Scotland, Northern Ireland, North West England) 
and south (South East and East of England) of the United Kingdom; north of 
Italy (Lombardy, Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige); and large part of Spain (e.g. 
Galicia, Madrid, Castile and León, Aragon, Catalonia, Andalusia). The regions 
of Paris (Île-de-France), Milan (Lombardia) and those in the north-west of 
Germany are the most noticeable stayers in terms of both inflows and outflows, 
suggesting a fundamental resistance to external shocks in terms of inward 
attractiveness and outward reach. Different is the pattern of regions such as 
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Scotland, South East and East England, Northern Netherlands, or Friuli-
Venezia Giulia in Italy: they retain their position in terms of outflows but 
improve their capacity to attract foreign investments. Other regions, such as 
Północno-Zachodni in the north-west Poland, Castilla-La Mancha in Spain, 
Lazio, Emilia-Romagna and Liguria in Italy, Yorkshire and the Humber and 
North East England in the UK, and Central Greece, manifest the opposite 
pattern, i.e. being stayer in attractiveness toward foreign capital but 
experiencing increases in outflows. 
While in fact some regions are stayers in terms of their FDI connectivity, others 
are climbers, improving their position in terms of inflows and/or outflows after 
the crisis. Climbers are marked in different shades of blue in the two figures 
depending on their position in the distribution of the relative change of their 
in/out flows before and after the crisis. If we focus our attention on the dark 
blue areas we can identify those regions that gained the most after the 2008 
shock. Figure 3 presents a rather disappointing picture: very few EU regions 
have been able to exceed their pre-crisis performance and – considering the fast 
growth of developing and emerging economies in the same period – it is clear 
that the shock has so far taken a conspicuous toll in terms of attractiveness of 
foreign capital. Climbers are some of the historically most attractive regions of 
Europe – South-East and South-West England, Scotland, Baden-Wurttemberg 
and the south of Norway – but also ‘new entries’ in the East of Europe that 
started from very low levels before the crisis, e.g. the eastern regions of Poland, 
some in Romania and Bulgaria, in the Baltic States, and in part of Turkey. 
Figure 4 shows instead a very different picture: many more regions have 
increased their outward investment projects after the crisis, possibly due to 
concurrent technological and organisational forces spurring the rationalization 
of MNE operations and boosting the offshoring of an increasing number of 
functions. Indeed, in almost all EU ‘old’ member states regions are investing 
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more abroad than they did before the crisis: South West and Wales in the UK, 
West and South West in France, some Italian regions in the north and the centre 
of the peninsula. However, outward climbers are to be found also in Eastern 
Europe, for example the northern regions in Poland, and in candidate countries 
such as Serbia and Turkey.  
Climbers with respect to both outward and inward flows are harder to find, 
with a few notable exceptions such as Baden-Wurttemberg and Hessen in 
Germany, the South of England and the Midlands in the UK, traditionally 
regarded as European regional winners; emerging winners may be found in the 
Adriatic Croatia, and in the region Wschodni in Poland. In line with the 
conceptual discussion developed in the first part of this paper, the winners 
show a remarkable increase in the magnitude of their flows that is coupled with 
bi-directionality, providing local actors with unparalleled connectivity and, as 
a result, with growing opportunities for the renewal of local and regional 
industrial structures.   
The regions that experienced a contraction in their connectivity after the crisis 
– here labelled slippers – are depicted in shades of red in both figures. Figure 
3 confirms that large part of the European regions have still not recovered from 
the crisis: slippers are located in the entire periphery of Europe – Portugal, 
Spain, southern Italy and Greece11 – although with different intensities, but also 
in France (East France), Sweden (East Middle Sweden) and Central 
(Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in Germany) and Eastern EU members 
(especially in some regions of Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovakia). Figure 4 indicates that that the reduction in outward investment 
                                                 11 Most regions in Greece seem not to be hit by the crisis as they are not colored in shades of red. However, this is the outcome of the limited number of investment targeting these regions already before 2008. Looking only at regions with at least 10 FDI projects before the crisis, we see that both of them – Attica and Central Macedonia – experienced a strong decrease in the amount of FDI received. 
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has remained confined to the eastern part of France (East France), Southern 
Italy (Apulia, Molise, and Sardinia), Sweden (Middle and Upper Norrland), 
Easter Austria, and many of the eastern EU members.  
Overall, the combined picture provided by both maps for slippers indicates that 
many peripheral European regions can be classified as losers, having lost their 
overall connectivity (inward and outward) through MNE investment flows. 
3.2 Spatial extent and nature of FDI flows in and from the European 
regions 
A balanced connectivity – albeit only partially captured with FDI data – may 
be considered a first indicator of the relative trajectory of the regional 
economies and their long-term resilience. However, magnitude and directionality 
of FDI flows need to be assessed jointly with their spatial extent and nature in 
order to develop a full diagnosis of local economic development trajectories 
and potential. Table 1 provides some relevant insights on the spatial extent of 
the FDI connectivity of the EU regions by showing the share of investment 
targeting and originating from three different categories of regions: the 
economic ‘core’, the ‘periphery’ of Europe12 and the Rest of the World.  
The table shows that the spatial extent of intra-EU FDI flows has remained 
largely unchanged after the crisis and that significant new emerging trends 
concern, instead, the position of EU regions with reference to extra-EU flows. 
An increasing share of investment from the core of Europe – that was 
previously targeting the periphery – has been diverted towards locations 
                                                 12 The core-periphery distinction is based on the Structural Funds (ERDF and ESF) eligibility 2014-
2020 adopted by the European Commission. Regions classified as less developed (GDP/head < 75% 
of EU-27 average) are labelled as peripheral areas, while regions above that threshold are instead defined as core areas. For regions in countries excluded from the Structural Funds classification the following applied:  
- Core: Andorra, Greenland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, and Switzerland; 
- Periphery: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. 
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outside the EU boundaries. The periphery is not only losing ground in terms of 
intra-EU (and even intra-periphery) flows, but also investment from outside 
Europe is more concentrated in the core regions after the financial crisis. When 
looking at changes in the total magnitude of flows to and from these groups of 
regions, it becomes apparent that the ‘core’ of Europe is able to gain in relative 
terms from the increase of the spatial extent of its connectivity, which has 
evolved targeting locations in the Rest of the World in order to compensate for 
the relative economic decline experienced by the European periphery during 
and after the crisis (see Crescenzi et al. 2016a).  
Table 1 – The spatial extent of FDI in the regions of Europe (changes in FDI 
to/from different groups of regions)   [CAPEX - Core - Periphery - Extra Europe] - Shares  from CORE from PERIPHERY from EXTRA-EU  PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS Growth Rate PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS Growth Rate PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS Growth Rate 
to CORE 20% 18% -16% 19% 13% -32% 72% 79% 1% 
to PERIPHERY 12% 9% -31% 28% 16% -43% 28% 21% -34% 
to EXTRA-EU 68% 74% 2% 53% 71% 34%       
Source: authors’	elaboration	on	fDi–Markets data 
The nature – in terms of business activities – of these FDI flows for stayers, 
climbers and slippers is captured by Tables 2 (pre-crisis) and 3 (post-crisis) for 
inward FDI, and Tables 4 (pre-crisis) and 5 (post-crisis) for outward FDI. The 
tables show the business function composition of investment into/from regions 
in different positions with respect to the distribution of the post-crisis change 
in FDI (where class 1 is the bottom quintile of the distribution and class 5 is the 
top quintile: these classes correspond to the color-coding in Figures 3 and 4). 
For investments targeting the regions of Europe the comparison of Tables 2 and 
3 shows that regions in the slippers category (classes 1, 2 and 3 in the tables) are 
those experiencing the most significant change in the nature of their incoming 
FDI, with a marked reduction in ‘production’ activities in favour of ‘services, 
sales and logistics’ and ‘headquarters’: Brandeburg, Bratislavský kraj and 
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Południowo-Zachodni are some examples of such trends.13  In a context of 
shrinking connectivity these regions remain relevant targets for market-
seeking investment and managerial functions. Conversely, the climbers (class 5 
in both tables) lose in ‘services’ but gain in ‘production’ FDI, unveiling some 
capacity to attract production investment projects notwithstanding their 
relative cost-disadvantage. The asset-seeking nature of these investment 
projects is more likely to produce development-enhancing effects in the local 
economy reinforcing the intrinsic advantages of an improved overall 
connectivity. Northern Holland, Eastern Holland and East England are all 
climbers that record a substantial increase in ‘production’ FDI with a 
corresponding decrease in ‘services, sales and logistics’. 
Table 2 – The nature of FDI inflows in the regions of Europe BEFORE the 
Crisis (Shares of business activities by class of change in Capex) 
Europe Destination - Business Activities only PRE CRISIS (2003-2008) - Shares Classes of change in Capex Headquarters Innovative Activities Production Services, Sales and Logistics 1 2% 2% 78% 18% 2 4% 4% 74% 18% 3 8% 4% 64% 24% 4 11% 2% 60% 27% 5 14% 4% 58% 24% 
Source: authors’	elaboration	on	fDi–Markets data 
 
Table 3 - The nature of FDI inflows in the regions of Europe AFTER the Crisis 
(Shares of business activities by class of change in Capex) 
Europe Destination - Business Activities only POST CRISIS (2009-2014) - Shares Classes of change in Capex Headquarters Innovative Activities Production Services, Sales and Logistics 1 6% 3% 65% 26% 2 7% 4% 61% 28% 3 12% 5% 55% 28% 4 12% 3% 56% 29% 5 14% 3% 64% 20% 
Source: authors’ elaboration on fDi–Markets data 
                                                 13 There are also several other regions following similar patterns but to a lesser extent especially in Spain (Pais Vasco, Galicia, Andalusia, Isles Baleares, Castilla y Leon, La Rioja), Italy (Abruzzo, Toscana, Ticino), Portugal (Centro, Lisbona), Germany and some regions in the Eastern Countries. 
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Similar changes in the functional composition of FDI can be observed for 
outward FDI in Tables 4 and 5. The slippers (in these tables corresponding to 
classes 1 and 2) tend to de-localise abroad relatively more of their 
‘headquarters’ and ‘services, sales and logistic’ and less of their ‘production’, 
suggesting that the latter tends to become progressively more local/less 
connected for these regions. Examples here include the North West in the UK, 
Bassin Parisien in France, Asturias and Comunidad Valenciana in Spain, Attica 
in Greece, and Sardinia in Italy. The opposite trend is instead in place for the 
top climbers (class 5) in outward FDI: the composition of FDI flows from these 
regions is becoming more oriented towards ‘production’ activities. This trend 
– visible in regions such as Bratislavský kraj in Slovakia, Castilla-La Mancha 
and Extremadura in Spain, West and South West of France, and Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia in Italy – might correspond to very diverse underlying economic forces. 
On the one hand, it may be linked to the offshoring of existing local production 
with potentially negative effects on local employment and economic activity. 
On the other, this may be an indicator of a stronger internationalisation 
capacity of local firms that, by expanding abroad, might be able to gain in terms 
of productivity and upgrading along the value chain. The actual combination 
of these opposite outcomes depends on how outflows are matched by inflows 
as well as on other local competitiveness factors that would need to be assessed 
jointly with connectivity in an integrated diagnostic framework.  
Table 4 - The nature of outward FDI originating from the regions of Europe 
BEFORE the Crisis (Shares of business activities by class of change in Capex) 
Europe Source - Business Activities only PRE CRISIS (2003-2008) - Shares Classes of change in Capex Headquarters Innovative Activities Production Services, Sales and Logistics 1 6% 0% 76% 17% 2 5% 2% 74% 19% 3 7% 3% 71% 19% 4 6% 2% 76% 16% 5 8% 2% 64% 26% 
Source: authors’ elaboration on fDi–Markets data 
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Table 5 - The nature of outward FDI originating from the regions of Europe 
AFTER the Crisis (Shares of business activities by class of change in Capex) 
Europe Source- Business Activities only POST CRISIS (2009-2014) - Shares Classes of change in Capex Headquarters Innovative Activities Production Services, Sales and Logistics 1 11% 1% 63% 25% 2 9% 3% 62% 26% 3 9% 3% 62% 25% 4 8% 3% 68% 21% 5 8% 1% 73% 18% 
Source: authors’ elaboration on fDi–Markets data 
3.3 Connectivity and regional development trajectories: some initial 
insights 
An in-depth analysis of the association between the spatial extent, nature and 
directionality of FDI flows and regional development trajectories would 
require the availability of regional indicators on a variety of social and 
economic dimensions, as well as the use of advanced statistical methods. While 
this approach is beyond the scope of this paper (and of the Special Issue in 
which it is hosted) some initial descriptive statistics offer preliminary insights 
on the link between connectivity and regional economic trajectories. Tables 6 
and 7 show the levels and changes of regional GDP per capita (PPS) and 
unemployment rates – crude proxies for regional development – for slipper and 
climber regions identified in Section 3, focusing on the 1st and 5th quintile in the 
distribution of the changes in inward/outward flows before and after the crisis. 
Table 6 suggests that climbers have generally higher levels of GDP per capita; 
interestingly, both climbers and slippers in the attraction of FDI show similar 
reactions to the crisis with comparable positive changes in GDP following the 
shock. The key difference between the two groups of regions is in their highly 
differentiated capacity to re-absorb unemployed workers: after the crisis, 
unemployment increased substantially more in the slippers than in the climbers. 
Whilst in the former group unemployment increased by 3.94 percentage points, 
against an average increase in the EU28 regions by 1.49 percentage points over 
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the same period, the climber group experienced a rise in unemployment by 1.1 
percentage points, outperforming the EU28 average. When regions are 
categorised looking at changes in their FDI outflows (Tab. 7), climbers show 
slightly higher levels of GDP per capita but also more favourable GDP 
adjustment patterns (+6.65%), when compared to slippers (+4.84%) and to the 
EU28 average (+4.71% over the same period). Conversely, changes in 
unemployment rates are more homogenous between the two groups (and in 
line with the EU28 average), confirming the potentially ambiguous link 
between active internationalisation and domestic employment. 
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Table 6 – Changes in Inward FDI flows and short-term regional economic trajectories 
  Europe Destination  
Quintile 
of 
change in 
Capex 
Number 
of regions Category 
GDP pc PPS 2005-
2008 
GDP pc PPS pc 
2009-2014 
'GDP 
PPS pc 
Unemployment 
rate 1999-2008 
Unemployment 
rate 2009-2015 ' Unemployment 
   
Average Gross domestic 
product per capita, Euro, 
PPS 
Average Gross 
domestic product 
per capita, Euro, 
PPS 
Rate of 
growth19
99-2008 
vs. 2009-
2015 
Unemployment rate, 15 
years or over, percentage 
Unemployment rate, 
15 years or over, 
percentage 
Difference 1999-2008 vs. 
2009-2015 
(1) 24 Slippers 24,158.33 24,327.08 0.70% 8.48 12.42 3.94 
(5) 16 Climbers 27,975.00 28,153.13 0.64% 6.36 7.47 1.11 * The number of regions in each class is lower than in previous tables due to the exclusion of outliers and missing data for GDP and/or unemployment. Note that the Slippers category only includes the regions in the bottom quintile of the change in capex distribution as discussed in the text.  
Source: authors’	elaboration	on	Eurostat	data 
 
Table 7 - Changes in Outward FDI flows and short-term regional economic trajectories 
  Europe Source  
Quintile of 
change in 
Capex 
Number of 
regions Categories 
GDP pc 
2005-2008 
GDP pc 
2009-2014 'GDP pc 
Unemployment 
rate 1999-2008 
Unemployment 
rate 2009-2015 ' Unemployment 
 
  
Average Gross 
domestic product 
per capita, Euro, 
PPS 
Average Gross 
domestic product 
per capita, Euro, 
PPS 
Rate of 
growth1999-
2008 vs. 2009-
2015 
Unemployment rate, 15 
years or over, 
percentage 
Unemployment rate, 15 
years or over, percentage 
Difference 1999-2008 vs. 
2009-2015 
(1) 25 Slippers 19,516.00 20,460.00 4.84% 9.20 11.08 1.89 
(5) 28 Climbers 21,189.29 22,597.62 6.65% 8.77 10.51 1.74 * The number of regions in each class is lower than in previous tables due to the exclusion of outliers and missing data for GDP and/or unemployment. Note that the Slippers category only includes the regions in the first quintile of the change in capex distribution, while the Climbers category only includes the regions in the fifth quintile of the change capex distribution as discussed in the text.  
Source: authors’	elaboration on Eurostat data 
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Finally, Table 8 explores the bi-directionality of FDI flows by looking at GDP 
and unemployment for winners and losers (i.e. climbers/slippers simultaneously 
for both inward and outward FDI). The key difference between winners and 
losers is not in GDP per capita levels (both groups are in line with the EU28 
average), confirming that our suggested classification does not reflect ‘simple’ 
disparities in income levels. Conversely, notwithstanding the similarity in 
initial conditions, winners benefit from more favourable post-crisis trajectories 
(at least in the short-run) both in terms of GDP and unemployment. Favourable 
changes in two-way connectivity are generally associated with higher positive 
changes in GDP per capita and – in particular – to very modest increases in 
unemployment rates. The winners suffered an increase in their unemployment 
rate by 0.41 percentage points against an average increase by 1.79 percentage 
points in the losers and 1.49 in the EU28. This provides tentative support to the 
initial intuition that two-way connectivity and its nature are fundamental 
elements for the understanding of regional trajectories, and should be carefully 
assessed in their interactions with other ‘keystones’ of regional development in 
an integrated (analytical and policy) framework. 
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Table 8 – ‘Winners’	and	‘Losers’	in	bi-directional connectivity and short-term changes in regional economic trajectories  
Europe Source and Destination 
Number 
of 
regions 
Category GDP pc 2005-2008 GDP pc 2009-2014 ' GDP pc Unemployment rate 2000-2008 
Unemployment 
rate 2009-2015 ' Unemployment 
    
Average Gross domestic 
product per capita, Euro, PPS 
Average Gross domestic 
product per capita, Euro, PPS 
Rate of 
growth1999-
2008 vs. 2009-
2015 
Unemployment rate, 15 
years or over, 
percentage 
Unemployment rate, 15 
years or over, percentage 
Difference 1999-2008 vs. 
2009-2015 
10 Winners             
  Average Winners 23,785 24,451.67 2.80% 7.35 7.76 0.41 
          
35 Losers        
Average Losers 22,515 22,797.86 1.26% 9.15 10.88 1.73 
Source:	authors’	elaboration	on	Eurostat	data 
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4. Global and regional interdependency: rethinking policy 
targets and strategies 
Connectivity is an essential dimension of regional economic development and 
is key to the diagnosis of development bottlenecks and untapped potential. In 
order to capture the way in which each region balances the costs of, and 
benefits from connectivity, we need to consider not only its 
intensity/magnitude but also its spatial extent, directionality and nature in 
terms of business functions.  
The consequences of global connectivity crucially depend on the capacity of the 
regions to actually implement and govern systemic integration, involving the 
co-ordination of a diverse structure of ‘value networks’, both localised and non-
spatial: this in turn requires capacity to manage institutional change 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2013; Rodriguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015). A more accurate 
understanding of the consequences of regional attractiveness towards inward 
flows – and the long-term processes of specialisation and diversification able 
to reconfigure local economic and institutional advantages – must be coupled 
with the study of regional outward reaching, from both domestic MNEs and 
SMEs, which can provide new knowledge links and a re-orientation of the local 
industry structure and economic functionality. Indeed, European regional 
winners seem to benefit from their balanced connectivity in terms of inward and 
outward FDI flows – possibly managing in a more effective way systemic 
integration between intra- and extra-region networks – and show more 
favourable post-shock adjustment trajectories both in terms of GDP and 
unemployment. 
The empirical evidence based on the growing availability (though still 
inadequate in terms of range and comparability of indicators to capture 
openness) of micro and territorial statistical data shows a wide heterogeneity 
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of firm and place trajectories. At the same time, the complexity of global flows 
and their dynamics highlights polarization processes at both individual and 
spatial level: while the channels for knowledge diffusion are more than ever 
diversified and tend to produce convergence effects, the creation of new 
knowledge and technology is highly concentrated, spurring divergence. The 
cross-border network-based organisation of economic activities leads to 
connectivity as well as isolation, strengthening or disrupting the path-
dependency of regional development trajectories with ambivalent winner-loser 
impacts for spatial (and individual) equity (e.g. Mudambi and Santangelo, 
2015).  
Heterogeneity and complexity require composite, diversified and tailored 
development policies, based on modular combinations of public and private 
actions, both from local and global sources. The modularity concept has been 
recently proposed as a base for ‘regional integrated policy platforms’ (Cooke, 
2007, 2013). The Schumpeterian ‘recombinative’ innovation process needs to 
focus not only on ‘old’ and ‘new’ knowledge, but also on ‘local’ and ‘global’.  
In the same way as for individual firms, what is new to one region might not 
be to others: new (re)combinations (and their cognitive building blocks) can be 
attracted or tapped into by ensuring connectivity at the micro and meso level.  
Modularity implies integrated intervention, i.e. micro-level support to 
individuals and firms – as, for example, in skills provision, training, 
innovativeness and openness encouragement – designed in conjunction with 
place-sensitive policies through the assessment of meso-level characteristics of 
industries/functions within regions, looking at economic, technological, social 
and institutional structures. Conversely, the national and international macro-
levels should provide the broad framework conditions for the regulation of 
global flows – with respect, for example, to sustainability, social responsibility, 
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tax regimes and human rights, and the integration with other forms of public 
intervention, for example social policy.  
As highlighted in recent contributions (e.g. Bannò et al., 2015), there is still scant 
appreciation of both region-specific factors and policy measures that influence 
local firms’ and other agents’ propensity to internationalise, offshore and 
outsource, or to overcome the ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995; see also 
Massini and Miozzo, 2012). As noted above, for example, on the side of 
outward flows most attention has been devoted to trade, manufacturing and 
the building of territorial comparative advantages, with limited consideration 
of how to promote general openness, stimulating individual and organisational 
risk propensity for ‘going global’, and spurring regional connectivity as a 
whole. Financial incentives and access to capital are necessary but not anymore 
sufficient to support connectivity: institutional capacity-building, technical, 
legal, fiscal and administrative assistance, targeted and timely information, 
provision of specialised skills, all support individuals’ and firms’ decisions to 
invest abroad, helping regions creating absolute advantages – or ‘knowledge 
monopolies’ (Malecki, 2010) – and offsetting growing territorial inequality 
(Bannò et al., 2015).  
The acknowledgement and evaluation of openness and heterogeneity across 
geographical space (Gambardella et al., 2009), especially in the case of 
European regions, is likely to improve the rather modest achievements of 
traditional economic development policies still firmly grounded on the 
maximization of inward-FDI- no-matter-what. New actions aimed at making a 
region less ‘provincial’ (Gambardella et al., 2009) – therefore increasing its 
overall international integration – have become pressing. More generally, any 
‘new’ industrial or regional strategy in Europe should be framed as both 
vertically and horizontally integrated platforms of place-sensitive 
development policies to simultaneously aim at different targets, including 
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individual and social isolation across geographical space, following “a coherent 
industrial strategy at various levels of governance, whether regional and/or 
national” (Bailey and Driffield, 2007, 189). Interdependence and connectivity 
make public policy particularly important (see also, Phelps, 2008; Neilson, 
2014) both by ‘looking up’ – i.e. lobbying to address global negative 
externalities that need be corrected through international regulation – and by 
‘looking down’ – i.e. supporting regional systemic integration and institutional 
capacity building for development and equity. In this context, successful 
interventions are premised on the availability of meso-level integrated 
frameworks and diagnostic tools that fully account for the relevance of 
connectivity and its multifaceted nature, transmission mechanisms and 
(asymmetric) impacts. 
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